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13 June 1968

The following paragraphs include (1) some CIA comments on the preliminary draft of the definitions piece put together by Sam Adams and [] and (2) our revision of that draft.

CIA Comments

A. Because paragraph 1 was missing on the draft we received, we do not know what the references are in paragraph 1.

B. We do not believe it necessary to make such explicit reference in so many places in the piece to the difference between OB and estimates. We would hope that the definitions suggested by DIA/CIA would simply add clarity and definitiveness to existing definitions. They should provide us with reasonable parameters for estimating. MACV is still left free to do his OB work and estimating as he sees fit. Recommendations for improving existing definitions should be presented on their own merit. To this end, for example, we would cut the sentence beginning "It is recognized" in the paragraph numbered 2. We would also cut similar references in the comments to the individual definitions. See our suggested text which follows below.

C. Note in particular our rewrite on the Infrastructure. The larger part of the CIA and MACV difference is in the village and above group where our problem is taken care of by the "all who are full time" concept. We recognize that some full time people on these levels are not key, but nonetheless, consider them valuable to the enemy and note that ICEX thinks

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so also. If MACV estimators and ICEX eliminators could agree on a concept at hamlet level, we undoubtedly could buy it.

D. In the lead part of the message, we would like to add a request that an insurgency base definition be considered at the same time noting that much of it is not defined as a combat threat. See out text which follows.

Text:

In keeping with the spirit of reference a and the recommendations in references b and c, DIA and CIA in concert have undertaken a review of our existing definitions in order of battle with the view of making them more definitive and more inclusive than those developed during the February 1967 CINCPAC Intelligence Conference. They were developed with the idea of establishing definitions which can act as a guide for both the estimator and the order of battle specialist. It is envisioned that they would be substituted for those in the present order of battle summary.

The reexamination covered all the existing definitions appearing in the monthly order of battle summary and considered a definition for an insurgency base concept, which would not necessarily have to appear in the military OB Summary, but would be included in estimates of overall enemy strength.

a. The Insurgency Base

The Insurgency Base includes all elements considered by the VC to comprise the military arm of the insurgency plus the infrastructure. These elements are, (1) the Main and Local Forces, (2) the Administrative Services, (3) Guerrillas, (4) Self Defense, (5) Assault Youth, and (6) the infrastructure.

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The Insurgency Base includes the elements making up the combat threat as well as low-order poorly armed supporting irregulars.

COMMENT: It is still felt that there is a definite need in our planning estimates for quantification of those organized elements considered as part of the "insurgency base" but which are not truly a military threat and have no place in the order of battle.

The following is a listing of those existing definitions in which changes or complete substitutions were made along with comments on their application:

b. Maneuver Units

(Old) Maneuver Units: Infantry, Armor, security, sapper and reconnaissance elements of platoon level upward regardless of subordination.

(New) Maneuver Units: Infantry, armor, security, sapper and reconnaissance elements serving at district level and above.

COMMENT: The old definition does not specify that guerrilla squads and platoons are not meant to be considered as "maneuver elements." The new definition would preclude this and allow for inclusion in an estimate of small units presently not included in the order of battle summary even though in some areas they exist. There is no requirement for a detailed listing by unit designator in the OB, although a general category with a single strength figure, either nationally or by corps area, should be included.

c. Combat Support

(Old) Combat Support Units: Fire support, air defense and technical service units organized at battalion level and above, and not

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classified under administrative service. Separate fire support companies are classed as combat support.

(New) Combat Support Units: Fire support and air defense units at district level and above, and technical service units subordinate to divisions and regiments.

COMMENT: New definition would enable the inclusion of technical service companies and smaller, supporting divisions and regiments as combat support elements. OB bookkeeping would entail separating out the Hq and Spt listings under divisions and regiments into maneuver and combat support whereas present listings carry the block total for Hq and Spt in these elements as maneuver. Consideration was given to including the technical elements under fronts as combat support but the feeling was that these fell under Administrative Services.

d. Administrative Services

(Old) Administrative Service Units: Military personnel in identified COSVN, military region, military sub-region, province, and district staffs, and rear service technical units of all types directly subordinate to these headquarters.

(New) Administrative Service Units: Military personnel in COSVN, military region, military subregion, front, province, district, city and area staffs, and rear service technical units of all types directly subordinate to those headquarters. These personnel include those directly supporting combat forces in South Vietnam from the contiguous border areas of Cambodia, Laos, and North Vietnam, and troops subordinate to out-of-country headquarters where they operate in areas under the jurisdiction of

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the above listed headquarters.

COMMENT: The new definition allows the inclusion of front administrative service personnel. The definition allows for estimates of unidentified administrative services when the evidential base and judgment so indicates.

e. Viet Cong (VC) Main Force (MF)

(Old) Those military units which are directly subordinate to Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN), a Viet Cong military region, or sub-region.

(New) Those military units which are directly subordinate to Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN), a Viet Cong military region, military subregion, or front.

COMMENT: New definition merely adds clarity; it has no effect on the OB or estimates.

f. Viet Cong (VC) Local Forces (LF)

(Old) Those military units which are directly subordinate to a provincial or district party committee and normally operate only within a specified VC province or district.

(New) Those military units which are directly subordinate to province, district, city, and area party committees and normally operate within the territorial jurisdiction of their respective headquarters.

COMMENT: Generally no effect on OB accounting; merely adds clarity.

g. Guerrillas

(Old) Guerrillas are full-time forces organized into squads and platoons which do not always stay in their home village or hamlet. Typical

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missions for guerrillas are collection of taxes, propaganda, protection of village party committees, and terrorist and sabotage activities.

(New) Guerrillas include platoons, squads, and cells, both overt and secret, directly subordinate to the party apparatus at village and hamlet levels. Village guerrillas are relatively well-armed and usually full-time, while hamlet guerrillas are usually part-time and partially armed. Typical missions for guerrillas include collection of taxes, propaganda, defense of home areas, and occasional offensive/harassing operations.

COMMENT: The new definition is more definitive than the old.

The Infrastructure

It was generally agreed that the existing definition for Viet Cong infrastructure is satisfactory so far as it goes; however, because of the broad interpretation that can be affixed to the definition, it is not considered suitable for accounting purposes.

It would be difficult to change the definition in such a way as to guarantee uniform accounting. We would suggest, however, that the following be added to the present definition or be utilized as a guide in accounting.

All full time personnel regardless of position at village level and above, and all full time and/or key personnel at hamlet level are considered as belonging to the infrastructure.

COMMENT: We would like MACV and ICEX to work out the problem of key personnel at the Hamlet level. We note that MACV's method of estimating

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the infrastructure at hamlet level excludes persons who are included in the ICEX totals of eliminations. Either the MACV estimative method should be more inclusive or ICEX should not include some of the low-level hamlet people in its eliminations.

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TRANSMITTAL SLIP

DATE 11 July 68

TO: AD/OER

ROOM NO. BUILDING

REMARKS:
attached is the
latest DIA draft.
The one I gave you
this AM. was an earlier
version. Not so.

FROM [Redacted]

ROOM NO. [Redacted]

EXTENSION 1/5V

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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PROPOSED CHANGES TO 1967 CINCPAC INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE OB DEFINITIONS

1(C)The following definitional changes have been proposed by the DIA/CIA working group:

a. Maneuver Units

(Old) Maneuver Units: Infantry, armor, security, sapper and reconnaissance elements of platoon level upward regardless of subordination.

(New) Maneuver Units: Infantry, armor, security, sapper and reconnaissance elements serving at district level and above.

COMMENT: Guerrilla platoons could erroneously be included as maneuver units under the old definition. The new definition would preclude this and allow for consideration of small units presently not included in the order of battle summary even though in some areas they exist. There is no absolute requirement for a detailed listing by unit designator in the order of battle, and their inclusion in an estimate must, of course, be dependent upon the best evidential base and analytical judgment. A single strength figure as an estimate should be a separate part of the OB summary or transmitted separately.

b. Combat Support

(Old) Combat Support Units: Fire support, air defense and technical service units organized at battalion level and above, and not classified under administrative

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service. Separate fire support companies are classed as combat support.

(New) Combat Support Units: Fire support and air defense units at district level and above, and technical service units subordinate to divisions and regiments.

COMMENT: New definition would enable the inclusion of technical service companies and smaller units supporting divisions and regiments, as combat support elements. OB bookkeeping would necessitate separating the Headquarters and Support listings under divisions and regiments into maneuver and combat support whereas present listings carry the total for Headquarters and Support in these elements as maneuver. Consideration was given to including the technical elements under fronts as combat support but we believe these more rightfully fall under Administrative Services.

c. Administrative Services

(Old) Administrative Service Units: Military personnel in identified COSVN, military region, military sub-region, province, and district staffs, and rear service technical units of all types directly subordinate to these headquarters.

(New) Administrative Service Units: Military personnel in COSVN, military region, military sub-region

front, province, district, city, and area staffs, and rear service and technical units of all type directly subordinate to those headquarters.

COMMENT: The new definition allows the inclusion of front administrative service personnel and administering. Service units serving in border areas including troops subordinate to out-of-country headquarters but operation in areas under the jurisdiction of the headquarters listed above. The definition is interpreted as allowing for estimates of unidentified administrative services when the evidential base and judgment so indicates.

d. Viet Cong (VC) Main Force (MF)

(Old) Those military units which are directly subordinate to Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN), a Viet Cong military region, or sub-region.

(New) Those military units which are directly subordinate to Central Office South Vietnam (COSVN), a Viet Cong military region, military sub-region, or front.

COMMENT: New definition merely adds clarity; it would appear to have no effect on the OB or estimates.

e. Viet Cong (VC) Local Forces (LF)

(Old) Those military units which are directly

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subordinate to a provincial or district party committee and normally operate only within a specified VC province or district.

(New) Those military units which are directly subordinate to province, district, city, and area party committees and normally operate within the territorial jurisdiction of their respective control headquarters.

COMMENT: Generally no effect on OB accounting; merely adds clarity.

f. Guerrillas

(Old) Guerrillas are full-time forces organized into squads and platoons which do not always stay in their home village or hamlet. Typical missions for guerrillas are collection of taxes, propaganda, protection of village party committees, and terrorist and sabotage activities.

(New) Guerrillas include platoons, squads, and cells, both overt and secret, directly subordinate to the party apparatus at village and hamlet levels. Village guerrillas are relatively well-armed and usually full-time, while hamlet guerrillas are usually part-time and partially armed.

COMMENT: The new definition is more definitive than the old. It is not expected that MACV should attempt to break out village, hamlet and secret guerrillas unless information becomes available. The term full-time is interpreted as meaning those forces who are

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permanent members of the guerrilla force, even though they engage in other occupations, and routinely operate in an offensive role away from their immediate home areas.

2. (S) It was generally agreed that the existing definition for Viet Cong infrastructure is satisfactory so far as it goes; however, because of the broad interpretation that can be affixed to the definition, it is not considered suitable for the present accounting purposes. For example, the infrastructure strength now reported, which is agreed by all concerned to represent only a selected portion of the total, does not conform to the current definition of infrastructure which is all-inclusive. The purpose of the definition needs re-examination to determine whether it should show the full complement of personnel or only those of some specified significance. We tend to support the latter, but think that a change in definition alone would not solve the matter. Since the matter concerns ICEX, we think that J-2 MACV and ICEX should review it initially. Discussion might include the following:

a. The infrastructure strength by echelon, job description, and rank -- general accounting procedure.

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b. A determination of that portion of the infrastructure considered essential for its continued existence and effectiveness.

c. The infrastructure strength as a base for attrition -- how large a base should the ICEX successes be measured against.

d. To what extent does the current infrastructure strength reported by MACV exclude personnel listed in ICEX totals of eliminations?

COMMENT: Dependent on your deliberations, possibly a breakout of the infrastructure is appropriate to identify first, the hard core or those who need to be eliminated to insure success of the pacification programs and second, an identification or estimate of the remaining less-important members of the political arm. These latter could be considered as part of the insurgency base (see paragraph 3 below)

3. (S) It is obvious the need exists for all parties to work out a coordinated definition of the "insurgency base." It need not appear in the OB summary, but is needed in support of estimates primarily to express recognition of those elements which are not truly a military threat and, therefore, have no place in OB, but nonetheless exist as part of the organized Communist intrusion in SVN. It would include elements such as Self Defense, Assault Youth, and portions of the political/administrative apparatus not reported as Infrastructure.